live play — Ed Miller Poker

Mistakes $5-$10 Players Make

November 4, 2014 by Ed Miller

This is the final article in my three-part series about the mistakes that live no-limit players make. This article covers the mistakes that $5-$10 players make. As with the other articles, I’m talking about how $5-$10 games play in Las Vegas. They may play differently where you live. But don’t take my stakes levels literally—the stages in no-limit player development are more universal, and you should be able to find players in your pool who fit the mold.

Even the weaker $5-$10 players tend to have some sophistication about them. Most commonly, $5-$10 regulars possess fairly decent hand-reading abilities, and many of the errors that separate the weaker players from the stronger ones in the pool depend on hand range construction. The weaker players tend to play a looser, more haphazard preflop game, which taints their play through the end of hands.

Players often try to make up the difference by forcing bluffs in inappropriate places. An example of this represents my first mistake.

Imbalanced Ranges On Certain Board Textures

One of the hallmark errors of $5-$10 players is that they build pots with unbalanced hand ranges on some board textures. I played two hands recently at the level that illustrate this error.

A loose, weak-for-the-level player limped in, and I made it $40 with 8h6h on the button. The big blind called, and the limper called.

The flop came . Everyone checked to me, and I bet $70 into the $125 pot. The blind folded, and the limper check-raised to $210. We were about $3,000 behind.

I have middle pair, a backdoor flush draw, and a blocker to the ten-to-six straight. More than that, there are relatively few hands that my opponent should want to check-raise on a board like this one. He could have a set or T-6, but my six blocks some of those hands. He’s unlikely to hold an overpair since he limp-called preflop.

He could have check-raised A-T, but in my experience he likely wouldn’t have check-raised weaker tens.

This is a situation where loose $5-$10 players like to make plays. I thought he could have any gutshot draw or also a number of overcards hands. Because there are so few good value hands on this board, I thought he was a fairly big favorite to be bluffing. My hand is the sort I’m happy to defend.

The turn was the . He bet $330. I called again. It’s a good card for me, and he bet well less than the pot size.

The river was the . He checked, and I checked. He showed 8-7 offsuit for a flopped gutshot, and my hand was good.

It’s not flat-out wrong to bluff boards like these. But because value hands are scarce, you must be measured also with your bluffs. I made an assumption that this player would bluff too many combinations on a board like this one. This time, at least, I turned out to be correct.

In this second hand, I’m the one who got caught with the imbalanced range.

I open-raised to $30 and got called in middle position and on the button. The button was likely my strongest opponent in the game. The big blind also called. He played more like a $1-$2 player than a level-appropriate one. There’s $125 in the pot, and we’re all at least $2,000 deep.

The flop came . The big blind bet out for $80. I made it $210, and the next player folded. The strong player on the button called. The original bettor folded.

I was in trouble. I had raised the big blind’s donk bet, since I felt it was very unlikely he was betting a hand that could handle any pressure. I would have raised a wide range of hands (here I raised two weak overcards with a backdoor flush draw), and I had very few legitimate value hands in my range. I likely would have just called with most overpairs or T-9 or 9-8 suited or 9-9. I would have raised 4-4 and A-9 suited, but that represents just five hand combinations.

So, realistically, I have a lot of bluffs and very few actual value hands. With a strong player on the button and lots of money behind, I’m toast. When the turn bricked, I checked and folded to $200 (a good bet size on his part that reflects his understanding of the situation).

I’m not sure what his range to call my flop raise was, but it could have been quite wide. There’s nothing I can do about it when he calls, and I get caught with such a poorly constructed range.

Value Betting Too Thinly

The pros that play $5-$10 are of varying quality. Many are just good enough to beat the weak players at the level. A few are much better than that.

One of the common plays that the weaker pros make is they value bet the river too optimistically. Standard no-limit hold’em advice is to value bet thinly to maximize your profit. If someone checks to you on the river, try to squeeze that value out of the weakest hand that you can.

When I play these pros, however, I find that they consistently value bet hands against me that are unprofitable. Sure, sometimes I’ll bluff-catch them with something weak, and they’ll win. But I have too many better hands in my check-calling range, such that they would have been better off just seeing a showdown.

For instance, I open-raised for $30 from two off the button. A pro called me on the button.

The flop came . I checked and called a $50 bet. There’s $175 in the pot, and we’re about $1,500 behind.

The turn was the . I checked, and he checked.

The river was the . I checked, and he bet $90. I called. He showed K-J offsuit, and I won.

After this action, I have an ace an awful lot. Ace-high overcards are smack in my flop checking and calling range. I can also have hands like A-4, A-5, and even A-9 suited.

Furthermore, what other hands do I play this way that possibly merit a river call? I likely bet the flop with most overpairs. I might play a hand like this way, but I’m not a lock to call the river, whereas I’m certainly calling with an ace.

I can even potentially have K-Q.

There’s no way my opponent wins with his hand more than half the time that I call. He should have just checked for a showdown.

When in doubt, I like to check-call the river against $5-$10 pros. They tend to bet the river too frequently—both as a bluff and for thin value. I find these players often make more errors when you show weakness than when you bet into them.

Final Thoughts

Everyone who plays small- and medium-stakes live games on a regular basis makes lots of mistakes. The nature of these errors changes as you move up the limits, but they’re always there. If you think logically and practice, practice, practice, any of these games is beatable.

[This article appeared originally in Card Player Vol. 27, No. 11.]

Mistakes $2-$5 Players Make

October 28, 2014 by Ed Miller

This is the second in my three-part series about mistakes that live no-limit players make. In this article I talk about mistakes typical of regular $2-$5 players. For the purpose of this article, I’m talking about $2-$5 as it plays in Las Vegas. It’s entirely possible that in your area, players at $2-$5 play more like the ones I discussed in the $1-$2 article—or that they play more like the ones I’ll talk about at $5-$10.

In general, regular $2-$5 players have learned a few important lessons since they’ve moved up from $1-$2. They’ve learned how to do a little hand reading. In particular, they’ve learned not to call all-in bets with weak pairs and wild hopes. They’ve learned how to pot control—they try to keep the pot small with modest-strength hands with showdown value. And they’ve learned that they can beat weaker players by pushing the betting when they hit strong hands.

Still, $2-$5 players make tons of mistakes that are easy to exploit if you know what you’re looking for.

They Wear Their Hand Strength On Their Sleeves

The hand-reading skills of $1-$2 are generally poor, such that these players often don’t know what they want from their hands. At $2-$5, players are much more aware of where they are in hands. For instance, a $2-$5 player holding A-T on an A-9-7 board will know that it’s likely that they have the best hand, but that it becomes much less likely if there’s a lot of action.

In response to this understanding, $2-$5 players will try to get their A-T to showdown with only moderate betting. To accomplish this, they will check a street or two, or they will shade their bets to the small side.

In contrast, holding 9-9 on the same board—or even A-K—these players would have a different outlook. They’d be trying to get money into the pot. After all, this is one of the things they’ve learned to do that helped them to move up. They’ve learned to consistently get value from strong hands. So they won’t check streets with these hands, and their bet sizes will shade larger.

In many cases, all you have to do is observe the flop and turn action, and you can have a very strong idea about your opponents’ attitudes toward their hands. You may not know the specific cards they hold, but you can fairly easily reverse engineer their strategy in the hand. This will often give you clear opportunities to exploit on the turn and river.

Let’s look at a few different theoretical flop and turn betting sequences and try to decode them using the logic of a $2-$5 player.

A typical $2-$5 player opens for $20 from two off the button, and you call on the button. The blinds fold. The flop comes . There’s $47 in the pot and $500 behind.

Scenario 1. The preflop raiser bets out for $65.

The bet is bigger than the pot, which indicates that the player is not concerned about keeping the pot small. But it also suggests that the player wants to protect a hand to the maximum, so the preflop raiser perceives his hand to be vulnerable. I’d expect to see a hand like A-Q or K-K after this action.

Holding two pair or a set, I’d just shove the flop, expecting to get called. With a draw—particularly a straight draw like 8-6 that is fairly hidden—I’d call the overbet planning to bluff for stacks on the turn and river if a spade hits.
I’d just fold the flop with a hand like J-J.

Let’s say you call and the turn is the . Typically on a brick like this, the preflop raiser will come out with another whopper of a bet—$150 or more. This bet would confirm my read, and I’d act accordingly. I’d never try to bluff (even with a combo draw), and I’d just shove any hand that could beat A-A.

Let’s say you call and the turn is the , putting both the flush and several straights on board. On this card, the preflop raiser will typically either check or make a small bet—perhaps another $65 or just slightly more. Either action tends to confirm my read. Against a check I’d make a small bet (perhaps $100), planning to shove most rivers. Against a small bet, I’d tend to minraise, again planning to shove most rivers.

You don’t want to commit your opponent with too large a turn bet, since it’s possible your opponent will feel compelled to call with a hand such as . I’d prefer to let the river brick, leaving my opponent with one pair, and then apply the maximum pressure.

Scenario 2. The preflop raiser bets out for $30.

This thought behind this bet is less clear. It could be a draw, a weak-pair hand like T-T or Q-T, or it could possibly be a big hand like 9-9.

Because the bet is small compared to the pot size, however, I will tend to call with most of my hands (the ones that connect with the
board—not 3-3 or ) and watch my opponent’s reaction to the turn card.

Let’s say you call and the turn is the . If the preflop raiser checks, it’s an automatic bet. On this board, if the preflop raiser held something of value, he’d almost certainly want to protect it with a bet. So against a check I’d bet the turn and likely, if called, the river.

If the preflop raiser bets big—$100 or more—he’s got a hand. Either he’s got something like a set, or possibly he has what he considers to be a very strong draw. You won’t see hands like Q-T after a betting pattern like this. I wouldn’t bluff against this bet size, since you’re likely getting called. With a legitimately strong hand like A-Q, it might be worth a call in hopes your opponent has a draw, bricks the river, and checks so you can check it down. If I called the turn with A-Q and my opponent shoved a river brick, I’d fold without much thought.

If the preflop raiser bets small, I will frequently call once more due to the good pot odds and gauge my opponent’s reaction to the river card.

Scenario 3. The preflop raiser checks the flop.

Most of the time, this will mean the raiser doesn’t have much and is concerned about the flop. I’d bet the flop small (about $30), planning to bet many turns if called. Most of the time, the raiser won’t last past the turn. On the off chance he is playing possum with a big hand, he’ll usually checkraise the turn, and at least I won’t have to worry about losing a river bluff.

Final Thoughts

While $2-$5 players have learned not to make gross errors, they don’t do enough to disguise their hands. If you observe their actions and use some logic, you can usually figure out what they’re trying to do. Then you just make sure they don’t get what they want.

[This article appeared originally in Card Player Vol. 27, No. 10.]

Bet-Sizing Tells

March 17, 2014 by Ed Miller

If you play live no-limit hold’em, then your games are absolutely rife with bet-sizing tells. If you know what to look for, your opponents will tell you in pot after pot what hands they have by how much they bet.

Or, at least, your opponents will tell you exactly how they feel about their hands by how much they bet, and you can often then deduce what they have.

I recently played the following hand in a $2-$5 game in Las Vegas. I had a $1,000 stack. A nitty regular player opened from under the gun for $20 with a $1,000 stack. Another nitty player directly to my right called. This player had about $350 behind.

I was next to act, three off the button, with Q-Q. I called. I dislike reraising in this scenario for a few reasons. First, both opponents in the hand are certified nits, and it’s unlikely they would call my reraise with worse hands except perhaps J-J or A-K.

Second, when it’s close, I like to avoid raising early in a hand, because the longer I draw hands out, the more information I can gather to make good decisions.

Third, there are still five unknown hands behind me. There’s about a one percent chance each player has either A-A or K-K, making about a five percent chance in total that one of the two hands I’m most afraid of is lurking behind me. While five percent is not a large chance, when the decision is already close, it helps to swing me toward the cautious play.

I called. The small blind also called, so we saw a flop four ways with $85 in the pot.

The flop came 9-4-3 with a flush draw. The small blind checked, the preflop raiser checked, and the nit bet $60.

Here’s the first bet-sizing tell. A $60 flop bet into an $85 pot is a big bet from a nit. This player is not likely testing the waters with a draw or a marginal made hand. He thinks he’s likely to have the best hand. He may have a set or he may have an overpair. He likely doesn’t have a nine, two pair, or any draw. It’s possible he’s got a very strong draw like the A-K flush draw or perhaps the A-5 or A-2 flush draw.

He’s also not expecting to get called. With a bet this large on a board this dry, he likely expects simply to pick up the pot. He will be on alert if anyone calls him.

I called. Again, I see this as a marginal raising situation. I’m ahead of some hands he can have, but I’m behind others. He’s a nit and he may fold a hand like T-T or J-J to a raise, while of course he won’t be folding a set. If I raise and get called, it’s not at all clear that I’ll be the favorite to win the pot.

Therefore, I called. Calling also allows me to gather yet another round of information before I have to commit my stack.

The two players behind me folded. The pot is now $205, and my lone opponent has about $270 behind.

The turn is an offsuit 7, so the board is 9-4-3-7. My opponent bets $65.

And here is the payoff for my patience. This bet carries with it a lot of information. Most poker players are ruled by their emotions. The plays they make are not determined by cold, rational analysis. Instead, they are determined by how they feel about the hand and about the situation.

Nits—players who play tight and are loathe to put much money at risk without a lock—are generally ruled by fear. They fear losing pots. They fear getting outplayed (at least when being outplayed means getting money in bad). They react to this fear in two ways.

If they feel they very likely have the best hand at the moment, but they fear getting drawn out on, they make particularly large bets. These bets are designed to “end the hand” and “win a small pot, not lose a big pot.” (While many people tell me that they prefer to win a small pot than lose a big one, my preference is to win big pots.)

If, instead, they’re afraid that they don’t have the best hand or that they’ve already been drawn out on, they check or make small, probing bets.

So this betting sequence—$60 on the flop and then $65 on the turn—is quite telling. The $60 flop bet is large enough that it falls under the, “I’m good, now please don’t draw out on me,” umbrella of thought.

But the $65 turn bet when the pot is $205 and my opponent has only $270 total says, “Please don’t let me be behind.” Since he would not expect the turn 7 to have beaten him, he must have one of the weakest hands in his flop betting range.

I put him on either J-J or T-T. With a set or even A-A, I would have expected more like a $150 bet.

Given my read that I was now likely to be ahead, I decided to raise all-in. I thought about calling again, hoping to confuse my opponent and get the rest of his money on the river. As it turns out, just calling may have worked out better, as he folded J-J face-up.

I rely on these bet-sizing tells so much that if my opponent had bet $150 or $180 or $270 on the turn, I would have folded my Q-Q. He simply wouldn’t be that bold with any hand I’m ahead of. I would expect to see a set.

Final Thoughts

I cannot overstate how much information there is in your opponents’ bet sizes. This information is particularly abundant on the turn and river when the pots and bets get big and emotions run high.

When in doubt, I drag it out. I flat-call early in hands and allow my opponents to tell me how they’re feeling with their turn and river bets. I then use this information to make accurate decisions.

Most no-limit players hate playing the turn and river. They like to end hands early to avoid the uncertainty that comes with seeing a troublesome-looking card. But for me, there’s actually less uncertainty on the turn and river than there is on the flop. On the flop, it’s harder to spot tells, and there’s less information to go on. Later in the hand, people really tell you how they feel, and you can then sometimes play nearly perfectly.

If you are a hater of the turn and river, here’s my advice. Watch your games. Watch hands you’re not in. Watch other people play the turn and river. Count the pot, and look at bet sizes. You’ll see clear patterns. Add in a little dose of psychology, and you’ll begin to see things much more clearly.

[This article appeared originally in Card Player vol. 25 no. 13]